5.4 Virtue Ethics and Ethics of Care

As we’ve seen, both deontology and utilitarianism use rational principles to evaluate the moral worth of actions: deontology is concerned with duty, universal rules, and good intentions for actions; utilitarianism values creation of good outcomes and the greatest amount of good/happiness. This section introduces two additional perspectives for understanding moral behavior that, in contrast, do not depend on a reasoned conceptual framework for guiding and judging moral action:

• Virtue Ethics, which dates back more than two millenniums, values actions in terms of what a person of good character would do.
• Ethics of Care, which emerged as a notable moral theory in the past half century, involves the moral importance of human relationships and dependencies.

Kant’s moral epistemological position, that making moral decisions is a reason-based activity, does not hold for virtue ethics or for ethics of caring.  As we will see, Hume’s position on moral epistemology, that moral decisions and actions arise from our emotional nature and sentiments, is especially compatible with the ethics of care.

5.4.1 Virtue Ethics

Virtue ethics is an approach to ethics that considers the moral value of an action by examining the character and virtues of the person performing it. An action is good if it is what a virtuous person would do. Moral actions are not measured by reference to normative standards such as rules and motives or utility and consequences.

Moral action is about character, what a person of virtuous character would do in a particular situation. Virtues are acquired character traits; they are not inborn or learned through reason. Unlike intellectual or physical characteristics, moral virtues are habits we acquire by practicing them and by emulating exceptionally virtuous people or especially virtuous actions. Through practice we may acquire virtuous character.

Aristotle: Ethics as Virtuous Character

In a major work, The Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle (384 – 322 BCE) describes the role of ethics as the cultivation of virtuous character. This work is believed to have been named after Aristotle’s son Nicomachus; if so, it is a fitting tribute to Aristotle’s idea that how we are raised makes all the difference. The Nicomachean Ethics is an expansive work about the pursuit of “the good life,” and understanding the good life is essential for achieving happiness. Note that the type of happiness being sought is not the subjective experience of pleasure; this type of happiness, eudaemonia, involves flourishing through intellectual excellence and moral virtue. For Aristotle, the development of a virtuous character takes place in the context of social relationships with others. Developing virtuous character is important because society becomes stronger; we will return to this idea in the unit on Social and Political Philosophy. The brief commentary and passages that follow serve to introduce Aristotle’s conception of virtue ethics.

While intellectual excellence is taught, moral virtue is habituated; we do not come by moral virtue naturally, it must be practiced and perfected. For example, one becomes a just person by performing just acts, a brave person through performing brave actions. Moral virtues acquired through persistent practice of good habits become inclinations and part of the virtuous person’s character. From Book II.1:

“Human Excellence is of two kinds, Intellectual and Moral: now the Intellectual springs originally, and is increased subsequently, from teaching (for the most part that is), and needs therefore experience and time; whereas the Moral comes from custom, and so the Greek term denoting it is but a slight deflection from the term denoting custom in that language.

From this fact it is plain that not one of the Moral Virtues comes to be in us merely by nature: because of such things as exist by nature, none can be changed by custom: a stone, for instance, by nature gravitating downwards, could never by custom be brought to ascend, not even if one were to try and accustom it by throwing it up ten thousand times; nor could file again be brought to descend, nor in fact could anything whose nature is in one way be brought by custom to be in another. The Virtues then come to be in us neither by nature, nor in despite of nature, but we are furnished by nature with a capacity for receiving them and are perfected in them through custom.

Again, in whatever cases we get things by nature, we get the faculties first and perform the acts of working afterwards; an illustration of which is afforded by the case of our bodily senses, for it was not from having often seen or heard that we got these senses, but just the reverse: we had them and so exercised them, but did not have them because we had exercised them. But the Virtues we get by first performing single acts of working, which, again, is the case of other things, as the arts for instance; for what we have to make when we have learned how, these we learn how to make by making: men come to be builders, for instance, by building; harp-players, by playing on the harp: exactly so, by doing just actions we come to be just; by doing the actions of self-mastery we come to be perfected in self-mastery; and by doing brave actions brave.”

Acquiring virtuous character entails practice and habituation, but even when one acquires virtuous inclinations, virtuous moral action is not an automatic response. A virtuous act must be appropriate for the specific situation or conditions.

“But let this point be first thoroughly understood between us, that all which can be said on moral action must be said in outline, as it were, and not exactly: for as we remarked at the commencement, such reasoning only must be required as the nature of the subject-matter admits of, and matters of moral action and expediency have no fixedness any more than matters of health. And if the subject in its general maxims is such, still less in its application to particular cases is exactness attainable: because these fall not under any art or system of rules, but it must be left in each instance to the individual agents to look to the exigencies of the particular case, as it is in the art of healing, or that of navigating a ship. Still, though the present subject is confessedly such, we must try and do what we can for it.

Essential to virtuous actions is the concept of middle ground, or the mean. The actions of a virtuous position fall between two extremes, between excess and deficiency. The extremes are vices, and the middle ground is a virtue. For example, in the face of fear, the virtuous action is one of bravery; the vice of excess is rashness, the vice of deficiency is cowardice. Similarly, with respect to relationships with others, being friendly is the virtuous mean between the excess vice of being ingratiating and the deficient vice of being surly. A person of virtuous character performs the right action, at the right time, for the right reason; in all respects, there is never too much or too little.

In like manner too with respect to the actions, there may be excess and defect and the mean. Now Virtue is concerned with feelings and actions, in which the excess is wrong and the defect is blamed but the mean is praised and goes right; and both these circumstances belong to Virtue. Virtue then is in a sense a mean state, since it certainly has an aptitude for aiming at the mean.

Again, one may go wrong in many different ways (because, as the Pythagoreans expressed it, evil is of the class of the infinite, good of the finite), but right only in one; and so the former is easy, the latter difficult; easy to miss the mark, but hard to hit it: and for these reasons, therefore, both the excess and defect belong to Vice, and the mean state to Virtue…

It [Virtue] is a middle state between too faulty ones, in the way of excess on one side and of defect on the other: and it is so moreover, because the faulty states on one side fall short of, and those on the other exceed, what is right, both in the case of the feelings and the actions; but Virtue finds, and when found adopts, the mean. And so, viewing it in respect of its essence and definition, Virtue is a mean state; but in reference to the chief good and to excellence it is the highest state possible.”

Video

This video provides a general introduction to virtue ethics; it reviews material on Aristotle’s ethics and introduces some modern virtue-ethicists.

A supplemental resource at the end of this section provides further examination of Aristotle’s “good life.”

Modern-Day Virtue Ethics

The three philosophers introduced here exemplify the view that standard normative theories — deontology and utilitarianism — are inadequate and ineffective for understanding the complexities of ethical life in modern societies. Each has adopted a view compatible with virtue ethics.

Elizabeth Anscombe (1919 – 2001) was a British analytic philosopher. Among her notable contributions was her article “Modern Moral Philosophy,” published in 1958. The article was a trailblazing contribution to modern virtue ethics. She argued that neither Kantian ethics nor utilitarianism provides ethical concepts can work in our secular culture. She believed that the standard ethical theories to be ineffective because they were based on religion. Instead, she thought morality should be based on what is “good” about human nature, a view compatible with Aristotle’s virtue ethics. Rather than describing an action as “right” or “wrong,” it seems more meaningful and illuminating to describe the “actor” as “just” or “unjust,” for example, or “honest” or “dishonest.”

Bernard Williams (1929 – 2003) was a British moral philosopher who regarded ethical life as too disorderly to be understood within the structures of normative theories. Like Anscombe, Williams was critical of both deontology and utilitarianism. He argued that both theories have a conception of the person that is highly theoretical; there is no regard for the deep-seated commitments at the root of human character, and impartial principles provide little useful guidance or reason for actions. Williams regarded the discipline of moral philosophy as ineffective, with abstract and impartial principles attempting to offer tidy, general answers, when in fact, moral problems are untidy, complicated, and highly unique.

Alasdair MacIntyre (1929 – ) is a Scottish philosopher. In his famous work After Virtue (1981), he describes the forms of moral reasoning produced by Enlightenment thinkers as a failure in their effort to provide a universal and rational account of moral reasoning. No calculation or formula settles moral disputes. The moral language that prevails in the wake of misguided moral philosophy serves mainly as a theatrical tool to manipulate public attitudes and decisions. MacIntyre believes that Aristotle’s conception of virtue ethics offers a more rational alternative to modern moral and political discourse because it is teleological, it has a purpose. The ultimate goal for acting as a virtuous person is to contribute to human goodness achieved as a community or society.

Supplemental resources at the end of this section provide further information on the three modern virtue ethicists introduced here.

Virtue Ethics: Objections and Criticisms

Virtue ethics, like other moral theories, has critics. Here are some of the objections raised:

1. Virtue ethics is too vague. The approach does not offer specific advice on what action should be taken. How does one know what a virtuous person would do?
2. Virtue ethics is relativistic. There are no absolute values that apply across time and across cultures.

5.4.2 Ethics of Care

The ethics of care focuses on the moral importance of human relationships and dependencies. Deeply caring relationships and dependencies with family and those close to us serve as a model for caring, moral behavior in the wider world.

Like virtue ethics, ethics of care entails no abstract theoretical definition of the “good” that humans use to reason out moral choices. But unlike virtue ethics, caring emerges from innate human capacities, where virtues are acquired over time through habit and practice. Caring stems from a deeply felt impulse to act on behalf of another person; this elemental motivation to care for others flows easily among people with close, familiar relationships, a mother towards her child, for example. Such caring is effortless — the impulse to act on behalf of loved ones is built-in, no habitual practice is required.

A supplemental resource at the end of this section provides a further introduction to care ethics.

Roots of the Ethics of Care

Psychologist Carol Gilligan (1936 – ) set the ethics-of-care perspective in motions in 1982 with her book In a Different Voice.  As a graduate student, Gilligan had worked with the notable psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg, who defined a set of stages for moral development that lead up to universalized and principled thinking. Gilligan observed that Kohlberg’s study, which initially included male subjects only, depicted patterns of moral development reflecting masculine perspective/bias. Later, when girls were included in Kohlberg’s studies, their scores did not measure up to the male standards. As described in “Care Ethics,” by Maureen Sander-Staudt,The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ISSN 2161-0002, https://iep.utm.edu/:

“Gilligan faulted Kohlberg’s model of moral development for being gender biased, and reported hearing a “different voice” than the voice of justice presumed in Kohlberg’s model. She found that both men and women articulated the voice of care at different times, but noted that the voice of care, without women, would nearly fall out of their studies. Refuting the charge that the moral reasoning of girls and women is immature because of its preoccupation with immediate relations, Gilligan asserted that the “care perspective” was an alternative, but equally legitimate form of moral reasoning obscured by masculine liberal justice traditions focused on autonomy and independence. She characterized this difference as one of theme, however, rather than of gender.”

This last point, that Gilligan sees the perspective of care ethics as thematic, and not as a gender difference, is important. Ethics of care came of age toward the end of feminism’s second wave, and on the cusp of wave three. And some feminist philosophers do claim that care ethics embodies a feminist value system. At the same time, care ethics developed as a theory about human nature not about feminine nature in particular.

Video

In this short video, Carol Gilligan addresses the scope of applicability of ethics of care and what she means by “different” in her book, In a Different Voice.

Nel Noddings (1929 – 2022) was an educator, feminist, and philosopher. In 1984, she published a detailed account of caring as the basis for a moral philosophy in Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education. Although numerous philosophers have subsequently produced works on care ethics with their own areas of emphasis, Noddings 1982 work, widely referred to simply as “Caring,” serves as a basis for our look at ethical caring.

Though Noddings uses a feminine/maternal exemplar as her starting point, like Gilligan, she saw caring as human behavior, not strictly feminine. She argues that caring provides a more precise characterization of moral intuition than is possible with universal principles that have no visibility to details or context. Caring is about relationships with others, and when caring, one becomes engrossed with the one they are caring for; and the cared for person reacts to the care. For Noddings, caring relationships are the bedrock of human existence.

Ethical Caring

The foundation of caring is relatedness to other people. The experiences of feeling naturally compelled to care for others who are close and familiar, along with the experiences of being cared for by them, create a model for relating to people beyond the inner circle of loved ones. Ethical caring emerges as a moral framework for acting in the world at large and for dealing with obligations and commitments to other people.

Ethical care entails emotional engagement with connection and appreciation for what is at stake, without distancing effects created by theoretical reasoning. Ethical caring requires involvement and paying attention. One feels the other person’s pain or joy but is not driven by the other person’s impulses. Being personally immersed in a situation requires regard not only for the other(s) involved, but also for ones own inner conflicts and sentiments. Even when emotionally engaged in a situation, one has the choice to accept or reject the feelings and to act accordingly.

Video

This video provides further information about Noddings and explains the meanings of some of her special terminology.

It’s quite possible that moral actions taken through ethical caring may be the same actions one could (theoretically) arrive at through the reasoning involved with other ethical theories. Let’s use this example as a thought experiment to compare application of the theories:

When immediate moral action is required, we often just know the right thing to do and jump into action, without rational deliberation. Noddings argues that caring captures our moral intuitions more precisely than an abstract theory can and that innate natural caring predisposes humans to be ethical carers.

Regardless of whether the situation is a knee-jerk call to moral action as with the scenario above, or a more complicated moral dilemma where there is more time for consideration, applying ethical caring involves:

• a confident sense of the kind of relationship involved,
• seeing the level of care-giving that is fitting for such a relationship, and
• acting appropriately.

Ethical caring envisions how one might make the situation better for those involved.

Ethics of Care: Objections and Criticisms

Like other perspectives on morality, care ethics has critics. Here are several of the objections:

1. Care ethics attributes an enslaved-caretaker status to women where their purpose is mainly to take care of others. (This objection comes from understanding care ethics as having essentially female applicability.)
2. Care ethics is vague and offers insufficient guidance for making moral choices.
3. By focusing on essential human characteristic of being caring, care ethics does not account for differences that distinguish individuals from each other.

Supplemental Resources

Aristotle and The Good Life

This lively whiteboard presentation provides a helpful overview of Aristotle’s virtue ethics.

Anscombe

This video provides a brief introductory lecture on Anscombe’s role in the reawakening of virtue ethics.

Williams

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP) Bernard Williams. This article is a comprehensive account of Williams’ work.

MacIntyre

This video is provides a very brief analysis of MacIntyre’s book After Virtue.

Care Ethics

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (IEP) Care Ethics  This reading provides an informative and helpful introduction to the ethics of care.